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THE LAW REVIEW ARTICLE
PIERRE SCHLAG *
Keywords: genre, frames, framing, scope-setting, baselines,
flux, form, aesthetics, legal reasoning, legal scholarship,
absurd, cass sunstein
Abstract: What is a law review article? Does America know?
How might we help America in this regard? Here, we
approach the first question on the bias: As we have found, a
growing body of learning and empirical evidence shows that
genres are not merely forms, but forms that anticipate their
substance. In this Article, then, we try to capture this action
by undertaking the first and only comprehensive
“performative study” of the genre of the law review article.
Drawing upon methodological advances and new learning
far beyond anything thought previously possible, we
investigate “the law review article” qua genre. What is it?
What does it do? What are its implications? How does it
make you feel?
By teasing out the infrastructural determinations section by
section, we demonstrate rigorously that there is both far
more (and far less) going on than meets the eye. In what is
the first instance in the history of the United States (and
perhaps the world) we enact in each section of the law review
article (e.g., Part I, Part II) whatever that section is ideally
supposed to accomplish. This is what we mean by
“performative study.” Using this approach, the reader can

* University Distinguished Professor & Byron R. White Professor of Law,
University of Colorado. A version of this piece was presented at the IGLP
Conference Panel on Contemporary Legal Thought at Harvard, June 2015
organized by Christopher Tomlins and Justin Desautels-Stein where the piece
was appreciated by some and not by others (as usual). My thanks to my friend
Fred Bloom who provided keen advice on this piece and who is in no way
responsible for its contents (or lack thereof). This work is part of the Tenure
Assist Network Forum and will be promoted through Equity-More Citation
Services. The FT Impact-Prognostics Factor was rated 4.3 (.2 tolerance) on March
10, 2017.
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experience first-hand what the law review article does to him
or her IRL. In a more conventional vein, it is hoped that this
Article will be useful to junior legal scholars, young scholars’
workshops, elite law school boot camps, faculty evaluation
committees, associate deans for research, law review editors,
and law school deans everywhere.
The Article closes with a call for improvements to the law
review genre, cooperative federalism, daylight savings time,
and the nature of the universe generally. The Article is
addressed not merely to the Court, but to the President, to
Congress, and, of course, to “We the People.” Perhaps more
than anything, we call for further sustained study of “the
law review effect.” A sequel, entitled “Dissertation Disease,”
is currently contemplated in order to undertake a similar
study of the University Press Monograph.

INTRODUCTION
The most important thing at the beginning of a law review
article is to excite the reader’s imagination, to evoke the hope
that what comes next is truly gripping. A page-turner.
Something totally out of the ordinary. Perhaps not even a law
review article at all. Once this moment is reached, it must be
brought firmly to an end, perhaps with the aid of a long
elliptical sentence, wandering around through pointless verbal
detours, ultimately to leave the reader disoriented and
wondering: What’s going on here?
There. Done.
With this attention-grab move out of the way, and before
the reader can recover his wits, he needs to be gentled into
recognizing that, as with so much else in life, things sadly often
are pretty much what they appear to be; that here, as
elsewhere, escape and exception are unlikely, and that the
typescript now well underway is indeed a law review article
after all. It is time for the hook of the first paragraph to be
domesticated into a manageable overarching statement that
will capture the serious work to follow in the march of the
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Parts. 1 (Part I, Part II, Part III. And so on.)
Now to be sure, none of this means that what follows
cannot contain a bit of errant humor, a couple of gestalt shifts,
or perhaps a flight of heroic transport. Still, in the main, the
prose to follow will be a measured display of expertise and
mastery—each weighted down and secured by the
accumulating gravitas of available data sets, archival
references, and serial bouts of case-crunching. With luck, most
of this will be reserved for the footnotes. Meanwhile, in the
text, seriousness is in the offing. Moderation and
reasonableness predicted. Yes, there will be some romance
(glimmers of utopia visible), but in the main, we will be doing
accounting. Literally or figuratively. Accounting and
documentation.
Voila. We are only at the fifth paragraph and already
expectations have been excited, subdued, and dramatically
lowered. Thus cowed into submission, the reader is prepared to
undertake the familiar journey. With readerly expectations
thus reset, it is the time to lower the burden of argument, as
well. This can be done explicitly (not very good form) or
through a more subtle frame-setting.
We will call the frame-setting happening now “entryframing” so as to distinguish it from other kinds of framing
that will occur later in the law review article. Among other
things, entry-framing allows the author to elicit certain kinds
of readerly attention (and inattention) as well as readerly
hopes (and anxieties). This is the law review equivalent of the
trial lawyer’s opening argument. It is a question of putting
certain audience faculties and orientations on high alert, while
lulling others to sleep. What we have here is what Althusser
called “interpellation”—the calling forth of a particular self,
oriented and motivated to undertake certain ideologically
structured roles, tasks, functions 2 (and crucially, not certain
others). Genres can do that. Yes, they can.
In the main, we will be foregrounding and backgrounding.
Certain issues, problems, questions, actors, agencies, action
will be placed front and center. Others will be set backstage or
1. Reference is made here to David Foster Wallace’s incomparable
description of the plane flight of the tax auditor. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THE
PALE KING (2011).
2. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN
AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 175–76 (Ben Brewster trans., 1972).
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even off-stage. For the committed advocate, entry-framing is
the place to smuggle in the most controversial claims and to do
so not in the guise of claims at all, but rather more subtly as
unobserved aspects of the scene. 3
Soon it will be time to close the Introduction. But first we
need to pose the inquiry that will organize all that is yet to
come. What inquiry? Note that it will have to be the sort of
inquiry that is susceptible to a plausible resolution through law
or law-like surrogates. The law-like surrogates are not quite
law, but take the place of law. “Legal theory,” for instance, is a
law-surrogate. Legal theory often presents itself (without ever
actually saying so) as the law of laws, the norm of norms, the
doctrine of the doctrines. Occasionally, we will put entire
disciplines or sub-disciplines in charge like this. But only if
they are good law-surrogates (in other words, only if they
already exhibit law-like aesthetics). Economic analysis and
analytical philosophy come to mind.
The important thing in articulating the inquiry to be
pursued is that the formulation must be stated in such a way
as to render resolution possible. The point is obvious and
nearly indisputable: law review writers never discuss that
which they cannot fix. No one writes a law review article where
the end line reads: “Well, in conclusion, it seems like we’re all
pretty much screwed.” That simply doesn’t happen. Which
means—and this is important—that if ever we were screwed,
you wouldn’t hear about it in a law review article. Ever. In fact,
the more thoroughly and intensely screwed we are, the less
likely you would be to hear about it in a law review article.
Weird, isn’t it? Yes. But it’s like that.
Let’s not think about it too much. The really important
thing, always in a law review article, is to carry on.
Perfectionism is the enemy. Capital letters and periods are
your friends. Keep moving.
On the bright side, the commitment to address only those
3. Kenneth Burke’s “dramatistic approach” helpfully shows how narratives,
ideologies, and philosophies can emphasize different theatrical terms (scene,
agent, agency, action, purpose) to achieve a variety of rhetorical effects. Here, I
am suggesting that one of the classic ruses of rhetoricians lies in using entryframing to ensconce their more controversial claims as aspects of the scene so that
these are registered as a background given (or not registered at all). KENNETH
BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION (1966).
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problems we can resolve renders topic selection much easier
than might first appear. As with so many other things in life,
the thing to do is to start at the end and reverse engineer. That
is what lawyers do for their clients and what we legal
academics do for our particular juridical utopias.
So then, what is the inquiry here? Very simply, it is an
inquiry into the character of the law review article qua formal
artifact. Formal as in “of form,” formal as in “formative,” and
formal as in “formalism.” The basic idea is that the very form of
the law review article is stylized and thus ineluctably enacts,
narrows, and channels what can be said and thought. 4
Notice that in and of itself, this is not a terribly interesting
insight. Of course, that’s what the law review article does! So
do the dissertation, the picaresque novel, and the comic book.
What else is to be expected? The thing that is of interest isn’t
that the law review article qua artifact is constraining,
channeling, or enabling. The interesting thing lies in the how of
it all—how and in what ways does the law review article enact,
narrow, and channel thought? That is the inquiry we will
pursue here.
Begin by considering what sort of overarching structure is
appropriate for a law review article. The genre furnishes the
answer. 5 Indeed, genres always furnish their own answers.
That is both the virtue and vice of genres. To give an example,
it is commonly said that in novels there are only two kinds of
stories to tell: “A Stranger Comes to Town” and “Someone Goes
on a Journey.” 6 The same is true of a law review article, except
4. It also, of course, opens up and sets forth the pathways for deviation and
subversion. A close study of the law review text/footnote law interactions across
the last 100 years would be worth its own empirical study. An analysis of the
changing hierarchies implicit in the Bluebook across the last 100 years would also
warrant attention. These kinds of micro-phenomena are hugely important as both
indicia and regulators of legal form—not the least reason being they go generally
unnoticed.
5. Genre studies is a vital field of study crossing a number of disciplines
(literary criticism, rhetoric, political theory, etc.). In my very preliminary effort
here, I will not get into the many interesting internecine disputes that comprise
the field. For a very useful cross-cutting introduction to genre studies, see ANIS S.
BAWARSHI & MARY JO REIF, GENRE: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY, THEORY,
RESEARCH AND PEDAGOGY (2010). It should be recognized that a “law review
article” is not just a genre, but simultaneously an artifact, a disciplinary
mechanism, a triage and certification device, a marketing tool, a . . . . All these
other matters—the political economy of legal scholarship—I leave aside here.
6. The number 2 can be taken as a first approximation of the number 64—as
in 64 stories to tell.
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that with a law review article, it’s not much of a journey (the
starting point and the end point are rarely all that far apart)
and strangers—at least real strangers—rarely come to town. 7
In the event real strangers do come to town, they are
quickly sent packing and enjoined never to come by again. All
in all, in a law review article, there is only one story to tell, and
the variants are almost always the same: “There is a problem,
a conflict, an issue, a puzzle, a contradiction, a paradox, an
aporia in the law. This Article will resolve it using the
approved m.o.’s of juridical discourse.”
Notice that we are fast reaching the limits of the average
attention span for an introduction. The reader is likely to
become impatient. If an oral presentation is at stake (faculty
workshop?), listeners even more so. This is the point where the
author should relieve the tension created by offering up a joke.
Preferably something subtle. Failing that, something rude and
abrupt.
PART I
Here in Part I, the author seeks to elaborate, fortify, and
cement the frames already activated in the Introduction. This
is called scope-setting and it involves a formalization and
specification of the entry-frame evoked and activated in the
Introduction. Scope-setting involves carving out of Maitland’s
seamless web of history (or by implication, law) some relatively
discrete something amenable to investigation or analysis or
argument—call it, the object of inquiry. Again, it is best,
rhetorically speaking, not to be too obvious about the whole
thing. But that is hard to do—particularly if we attend to what
we are doing—as indeed Maitland does:
Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavors
to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears a
seamless web . . . . The web must be rent; but as we rend it,
we may watch the whence and whither of a few of the
severed and ravelling threads which have been making a

7. On the law review article as a prototypical example of the “hero’s
journey,” see Omri Ben-Zvi & Eden Sarid, Legal Scholarship as Spectacular
Failure (forthcoming 2017) (on file with University of Colorado Law Review).
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pattern too large for any man’s eye. 8

It’s hard to detach from the beauty and violence of Maitland’s
lyrical touch. Still, pay no mind. We are called to move on. This
is a law review article. Capitals followed by periods. Periods
followed by capitals. Footnote. Footnote. Footnote. Just keep
moving.
The next step is to stabilize the putative object of inquiry
in one or a few, but certainly not many, disciplinary contexts.
The reason we want a few (and not many) contexts is so that it
becomes possible to say something about the object of inquiry,
as opposed to . . . having to say everything about it. (You people
who do cultural legal studies, pay no attention here.)
The most interesting thing about scope-setting is that it is
utterly impossible. Indeed, of all the perfectly preposterous
moments in a law review article, scope-setting is among the
most outrageous and improbable of them all. It cannot be done.
It cannot succeed. 9 And yet—like petitionary prayer or the
claim of Supreme Court nominees that they will follow the law,
not make it—it is done all the time. 10
Scope-setting is the point where, if we had a lucid author,
he would close his laptop, dim the lights, reach for the scotch,
and brood various gloomy thoughts about his ill-chosen career.
A person of real integrity would think seriously about taking
up writer’s block.
Obviously, that does not include anyone here.
Why is scope-setting impossible? I refuse to go into it. If I
go into it, you and I will be wandering this text for hours,
possibly days. O.K. Never mind, here it is really quickly:
Everything we, as moderns, think we know about law and
8. Frederic William Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L.
QTRLY REV. 13 (1898).
9. For elaboration, see Pierre Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble—Something
Amiss in Expertopia, in IN SEARCH OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Chris
Tomlins & Justin Desautels-Stein eds., Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming
2016) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741144 [https://perm
a.cc/JYB6-PAYN] [hereinafter, Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble].
10. Now here I should caution that many writings in law reviews are not law
review articles at all. That is to say, that they deviate so substantially from the
genre that they might be classified as something else. I point this out because
these other writings may not have a scope-setting problem. They may have other
problems, but they could well evade this one.
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world—Maitland’s “seamless web,” the butterfly effect, 11
Piaget’s nesting, 12 Thomas Reed Powell’s “legal mind,”13
Sartre’s “worm at the heart of being,” 14 Derrida’s
“Differance,” 15 Lyotard’s Differend, 16—all of this and so much
more tell us incontrovertibly that scope-setting in law (as in so
much of social life generally) is an illusory act. It is, to put it all
too simply, an attempt by force of text to impose a static frame
on matters we know or at least strongly believe will not stay
put and almost always exceed any and all efforts at conceptual
containment. 17 (You people who do analytical jurisprudence
and are still into necessary and sufficient conditions, pay no
attention here.)
Now, I am not actually going to offer up an argument for
this view, but will instead offer a quote from Bakhtin that I
have been saving on several succeeding generations of laptops.
As it’s beginning to look (given the track record) that the quote
has a good chance of going entirely unused, I have decided to
use it now. Here goes:
The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically
agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words,
value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex
interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others,
intersects with yet a third group: and this may crucially
11. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS THEORY: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1988) (the
metaphorical notion “that a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can
transform storm systems next month in New York”).
12. JEAN PIAGET, STRUCTURALISM, 28–29 (Chaninah Maschler trans., 1970)
(the notion that there is no form or content per se, but rather that the two are
relations such that a given form is content for some other form and so on and so
forth).
13. Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1930) (quoting Thomas Reed Powell: “If you can
think about something which is attached to something else without thinking
about what it is attached to, then you have what is called a legal mind.”).
14. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 21 (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,
1956) (“Nothingness lies coiled like a worm at the heart of being.”).
15. JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978)
(explaining differance as a neological “non-concept” for the structural incapacity of
any meaning to coincide with itself—it is thus always different and always
deferred (hence, Derrida’s coinage of the neologism differance)).
16. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE xi
(Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 2002) (conceptualizing a differend as a conflict
between two parties that cannot be equitably resolved because of the absence of a
rule or principle fairly applicable to both arguments).
17. I go into it here. Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble, supra note 9.
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shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers,
may complicate its expression and influence its entire
stylistic profile. 18

There.
Perhaps the quote is worth a second read? No? Just a
thought. Bakhtin really does trigger the right sort of confusion.
It is important to be confused sometimes. If you are doing law
and you are not ever (ever) confused, then you are simply not
paying attention. So come on, a second look? No?
O.K. Moving on then.
PART II
This would be the literature review and methodology
section.
O.K. Well, enough of that. 19
PART III
Here we get to the theory part of the law review article.
This is the part that could well be nearly unintelligible to law
review editors† and might well lead one or more (or possibly all
of them) to question whether the article should be published at
all. The disturbing question will loom for the editors—does this
18. M. M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 276 (Michael
Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981).
19. It is possible that in this section, the reader will be apprised that while
the issues have been discussed before in enlightening ways, prior discussions have
been less than satisfactory. (Here “less than satisfactory” is a technical phrase
meaning roughly, “not even worth a glance after my Article.”) The reader will then
be told that prior discussions very likely have miscast or misprised the crucial
issues. Or that they have failed to plumb the full depths of the dilemma. Or that
there is some new learning, as yet untapped. Or yet again that prior work may
have deployed the wrong methods or proceeded from the wrong vantages
or . . . (and so on). After this recitation of past failures, the author must announce
that, in sharp (and wholly improbable) contrast to all prior discussions, the
instant Article will take a different approach. Specifically: where countless other
articles have failed (body counts are still being tabulated) the present Article will
succeed. Yes!
† Editors’ note: No, we totally get it.
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author actually know his or her stuff or is the law review about
to embarrass itself in print . . . from here to eternity? It is at
this point that credentialism can help. Indeed, the right email
address, the right zip code, the right authorial name, the
extensive listing of notable names in the first vetting footnote—
all of these things are extremely useful to allay fears or
concerns. I mean, if the author has the right provenance and
certifications and still the article crashes . . . I mean, who
would have thought—right?
Let’s dig in.
Notice that all the difficulties that throttle the possibility
of scope-setting—let’s give them a name: let’s call them
agencies of flux and disturbance—are not matters that we can
fix by addressing them explicitly. That will not do because, of
course, when we address these agencies of flux and disturbance
(“AFAD”) explicitly in our texts, we do so by first trying to
stabilize them—which is to say, we try to do the very thing that
Bakhtin, and later Derrida, describe as impossible.
Still, many of our readers do not read Bakhtin (“Who?”) or
Derrida (“Oh yeah, that guy”) and so there is some possibility
that when AFAD is mentioned in our texts, AFAD will stay
put. AFAD is AFAD. Perhaps the best way to establish that
AFAD can be stabilized is to break it down into its constituent
elements. Like this. There are four parts to AFAD:
A
F
A
D

See—it works. Justice Scalia famously used the same m.o. in
the case of District of Columbia v. Heller to decipher the
meaning of the Second Amendment’s right “to keep and bear
arms.” 20 According to Justice Scalia, there are four parts to the
right to keep and bear arms:
R
K

20.

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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B
A

Justice Scalia’s approach was in stark opposition to Justice
Stevens who in dissent analyzed the thing as follows:
R
KBA

This made for thrilling disagreement: Which is it? Is it . . .
R
K
B
A

or is it . . .
R
KBA?

The important thing here is to try to keep a straight face
through it all.
The eyes of the law review article editor are glazing over.
The mind wanders. Images come into focus: a drop of
condensation sliding down a cold glass of Sauvignon Blanc, the
liquid gold of a rye on the rocks. Steam swirling upward from a
cup of espresso on a cold white marble table. The rain outside
has stopped. The streetlights and the puddles sparkle. All
right. Everybody take a break.
O.K. Break over.
Remember AFAD and the quote from Bakhtin above?
Imagine now that we treat AFAD—the “agencies of flux
and disturbance”—seriously. If we start delving seriously into
AFAD, things will likely get dynamic, mutable, and
uncontainable. That in turn would be antithetical to the
obvious aims of the law review article—namely, to present an
identifiable, stabilized, stand-alone, portable, off-the-shelf, bit
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of knowledge—supported by a massive and eminently
forgettable substructure of documents, data, and other such
artifacts. 21
If that is the desired endpoint, then it is desirable to
minimize the flux and disturbance at inception. Indeed, the
genre of the law review article is a performative confirmation
that the best way to reach the end of an argument successfully
is, well . . . to begin very close to the end while claiming
nonetheless to start very far away. 22
PART IV
This part is generally the pièce de resistance—the place
where the argument kicks in. This is the place where things
are really going to happen. Picking up the thread in Part I, the
crucial question is whether there is something entrenched in
the genre we know as the law review article that effectively
contributes to its stabilizing effects.
Uhm—yes. Emphatically so. Notice that one way of
thinking about the law review article is that it is itself at the
level of form a precipitation, a freezing of the state of the art of
legal thought and legal knowledge. More vexingly, it may be a
freezing at the level of form of the state of art circa fifty or a
hundred years ago.
Where intellectual life (or indeed, any kind of life) is
concerned, freezing is seldom an auspicious metaphor. In law,
we are supposedly beyond the freeze-dried forms of formalism.
And yet in the highly stylized character of the law review
article, its stock of stereotyped gestures, its relentless pretense
to knowledge, its predictable (and predictably inconclusive)
policy and principle analysis, we repeatedly comply with the
form . . . which, when you think about it is all that formalism
really needs to survive. 23
21. See Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble, supra note 9.
22. See generally the work of . . . .
23. This brings us oddly to the Bluebook, which, in its 524-page
crystallization of space-saving abbreviations and stylized citation rules, regulates
the hierarchies, reductions, equations, contraries, negations, etc., that comprise
the organization of contemporary legal knowledge. The Bluebook, in all its
hypertrophic glory, is an extraordinary accomplishment: It is an important
regulatory protocol of contemporary legal knowledge. (This is not entirely a
compliment.) For an eminently justifiable critical assessment, see Richard A.
Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 YALE L.J. 850 (2011).
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A question now: Why do we honor such a dated and
possibly archaic form? Why is it that legal academics don’t
break out more often? Why do they, for instance, repeatedly
seek out the protective shelter and over-used pathways of a
sub-disciplinary genre (e.g., ELS) or a grand maître (e.g.,
Foucault) and try so (so) hard to conform to its methodologies
or his protocols, respectively? What is the draw of compliance
and submission for academics? What is it that appeals in this
quest for paradigm-compliance? Why are they doing this?
The little homunculus on my shoulder is already
whispering an answer in my ear: “Because they’re academics,
dude. Focus! This is academia. It’s what they do. It’s who they
are. Pay attention, dude!” The aspiration, the affect, and the
ideal may be intellectual achievement. But the practice and the
reality is academia. “Forget it Jake, it’s . . . .”
But I do not listen to the homunculus. And instead, I ask
again:
Why do this? Why paradigm-compliance?
This calls for explanation. And I would try my hand at it,
but for the fact that in the post-postness of our post-millennial
moment, explanation of social phenomena is either way too
facile or, if one has real standards, insuperably difficult.
Here I want to refer to an anonymous speaker who at a
recent colloquium presciently asked, referring to the
phenomenon he was busily describing, “Why is this
happening?”
Yes, indeed, why? I wondered. In fact, why is this
colloquium happening? Why are you happening? Why am I?
Hell, why is anything happening? Point being, of course, that
the question (why is this happening?) immediately points to the
impossibility of the answer. The “why?” in question will only be
answered within a frame that everyone pretends is already
stabilized (when, of course, it is not) for a subject presumed to
be universal (but who could not possibly be) from a limited set
of vantages and specified orientations (which, of course, are
neither).
“Why is this happening?” Really? You dare ask that? This
late in the game?
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Here I want to refer to the work of Professor Max Stein
who in my recently published novel, “American Absurd”
(currently available at competitive prices on Amazon and
elsewhere), tries to do what he calls “the structures of the
meaningless.” Fighting off what could be a bad case of writer’s
block, Max Stein has been striving to figure out why the other
human beings around him are persistently pursuing
meaningless human activities—going from A to B over and
over again, without, it seems, actually getting anywhere. Or at
least, that’s the way it seems. In any event, Professor Stein has
made a list—a preliminary inventory of the possible
permutations:
A to B (progression)
A to A (stasis)
A to B which becomes an A for another B, etc. (serial repetition—
neurosis)
A to B followed by B to A (circularity)
A never get to B (futility)
A to nowhere (nihilism)
Why B? (skepticism)
What B? (radical skepticism)
B to A (contrarianism)
A/B (Gnosticism)
ABABABAB (schizophrenia) 24

But why go from A to B? Yes, why indeed? Here too
Professor Stein has compiled a preliminary list:
Because B is better than A (progress)
Because we’re fated (destiny)
Because we’re hardwired (human nature)
Because we so choose (existentialism)
Because that’s what our people do (sociology)
Because we have false consciousness (Marxism)
Because no one has yet thought of anything else. 25

After compiling these lists, Professor Max Stein notes that the

24.
25.

PIERRE SCHLAG, AMERICAN ABSURD 124–25 (2016).
Id. at 125.
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patterns and the explanations are all too facile.
Indeed. As the Charles M. Fairmont Chair in Cognitive
and Rhetorical Studies at Berkeley (and a fictional character),
Max Stein only occasionally writes about law. 26 But his points
are no less applicable to our field. In law, if we are seeking
explanation, we might ask, “Why is this particular law the way
it is?” Well, consider the classic forms of the available answers:
Because of this law’s object. Because of this law’s context.
Because other laws are the way they are and not something
else. Torts is torts because it is not busy being property. That’s
because property is busy being property. 27 Because our
sentence structures always have subjects doing things by way
of verbs to direct objects thus secreting entailment (e.g., causal)
links right and left. 28 Because . . . .
Max Stein is hardly a nihilist, but he does appreciate that
the explanations he catalogues are academic fictions that work
in part because they track not only language, but the folk-logic
of cultural myths. When we, as academics, track these fictions,
they cannot help but resonate with the myths.
But, as Max Stein notes, our trouble is that we have lots of
myths. And so there are lots and lots of resonances. And
everything is overdetermined (lots of resonance) and underdetermined (pay attention to the entry-frame setting that
artificially narrows the range of possibilities).
Oh, it’s all so complicated!
Well, uh, no, actually—it’s not. Not complicated at all if
you’ve been following what I am saying. It’s just that accepting
what I am saying is not going to make your life as an academic
any easier. On the contrary, accepting what I am saying is
going to make your life as an academic considerably more
26. Pierre Schlag, The Faculty Workshop, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 807, 821–22 (2012)
(comments of Max Stein on “stage 4” and “gaming”).
27. If property were not busy doing its property thing, then torts might have
to step in and do some of this property work. (Then property would look
different.).
28. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (Walter Kaufmann ed.,
Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967). Nietzsche observed:
Our bad habit of taking a mnemonic, an abbreviative formula, to be an
entity, finally as a cause, e.g., to say of lightning “it flashes.” Or the little
word “I.” To make a kind of perspective in seeing the cause of seeing:
that was what happened in the invention of the “subject,” the “I!”
Id. at 294, § 548.
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difficult. It will certainly be harder for you to write that next
law review article. I actually think that’s a good thing and will
make things a whole lot more fun for the rest of us, but I totally
get it if you are tired or otherwise don’t agree.
From my admittedly idiosyncratic perspective, it does not
help entirely here (though it does help some) that when we
academics meet together across the mediation of a screen or a
text or a podium, we spend our time testing our respective
fictions against each other to see which fiction will resonate
more emphatically than the others. Most of us focus on the
contestation—the points of disagreement, dissonance, and
disjuncture. We are natural born critics. And if we are not,
then training or occupation will make us so.
One could reasonably think then, what with all this
criticism and reciprocal scrutiny of each others’ work, that we
are getting somewhere. Well, maybe. And then again, maybe
not: it is important to recognize that amidst the sometimes
acute reciprocal criticism, there is a congenial symbiosis and at
least a weak unity underlying our particular contest of
faculties. Indeed, the expression of our differences
performatively re-enforces a shared form, aesthetics, narrative
structure, style—one which at a fundamental level affirms the
cheery sense that law and world are ultimately understandable
in terms of entailments within webs of intelligibility.
We make the connections the best we can. We differ to be
sure in our preferred verbs. Here I offer a typology (always a
good move in a law review article and very much appreciated
by the reader).
TABLE 1: A TYPOLOGY
Linear Entailment. For those predisposed to one-way linear
entailment, it can be said that X causes, constitutes,
structures, performs, logically determines, reflects, shapes,
and/or justifies Y. (Viewed grammatically, and with due
attention to “lumpiness” and “indivisibilities,” the choices
here are not endless.) 29
Reciprocal Entailment. For those predisposed to reciprocal
29. On lumpiness, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1955 (2012). On indivisibilities, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of
Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1669–71 & nn.20–21 (1989).
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entailment, one adds adjectives that morph the one-way
relation into much more problematic two-way relations:
hence the relations are dialectical, dynamic, interactive,
cyclical, looped, and so on.
Dedifferentiation. For those willing to consider even more
unsettling understandings in which the identities collapse
into each other (thus making relations impossible) concepts
such as dedifferentiation beckon. 30

Are these three types of entailment fictions? Well, maybe
so. But even then, they are plotted fictions. And many of them
are plotted in ways sufficiently enduring (social construction)
that they become the plots of our thinking and our lives. These
illusions are made real through collective action (inter alia,
law) and realized as institutional practice (inter alia, law
again) which is to say that they are, at least, in part true. Or
more accurately, they are made true.
Is this something to complain about? Well, no, not
obviously. Look at it this way: it may well be that repeating
these fictions are all we can hope for from our academic forays.
And maybe that’s just fine. Why would it be just fine? Because
describing law and world in tried-and-true fictional forms of
entailment and webs of cultural intelligibility is what
explanation and understanding mean (even if entailments and
the webs of intelligibility are themselves fictions). Perhaps this
is all there is—and until someone comes up with something
else, all there is is just fine.
Or at least, it will have to do. Maybe.
Two nagging thoughts remain.
Thought One. The more we awaken, the more we will find
that our intellectual efforts are haunted by the possibility that
we are not really thinking at all, but simply rehearsing
conventional narratives of entailment. We think we are
explaining and understanding, but in point of fact, maybe legal
academic work is just an extraordinarily intense version of
30. See generally Pierre Schlag,
CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 35 (2009).

The

Dedifferentiation

Problem,

42
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connect the dots—a kind of ratiocinative compulsion prefigured
for us by forces and structures whose identity and workings we
do not (yet) appreciate or fully understand.
Or in Niels Bohr’s admonition, “No, no, you’re not
thinking; you’re just being logical.” 31 Coming to this realization
could be kind of dispiriting. Consider: for all our careful
collection and painstaking assembly of evidence and our
elaborate presentation of argument in the law review article, it
would all nonetheless be only one more repetition of the master
patterns of our disciplines. Even the most innovative moments
might be seen as rehearsal and repetition. Hence, for instance,
Bruce Ackerman’s distinction between “higher lawmaking” and
“normal politics,” could be seen as law’s approximation of
Thomas Kuhn’s “revolutionary” versus “normal” science. 32
Ackerman’s famous “constitutional moments” might be seen as
a juridical mimesis of Kuhnian “paradigm shifts”? Dworkin’s
Hercules could be seen as . . . . 33
No, I have to stop this. It’s not nice. And it’s cheap.
Everyone would fall here. You, me. Everyone. And even if it is
right, so what? Surely we’ve known all along that to be creative
in a good way means precisely this—the new, unexpected, and
previously unremarked enactment of a possible permutation
within the allowed structural possibilities?
O.K. But what if we are not Ackerman or Dworkin? (Note,
there is considerable evidence that we are not.) What if the
patterns we’re enacting are more pedestrian, more routine? Or
to say it outright: what if the patterns are banal? Are we really
needed? Are you? Am I? All right, enough! This is not Paris
1938. This is not beer spilling from the glass onto the table.
This is a law review article. I apologize. I got carried away.
Let’s move on.
Well, not yet. Perhaps the genre really is irredeemable—an
effort to please judges, students, lawyers, law professors that in
the end pleases no one? Perhaps it is time for it to go down and
to be replaced by a more creative, thought-inspiring type of
legal writing. True—the genre as it stands has exchange value
31. Attributed to Niels Bohr in William Glen, How Science Works in The
Mass-Extinction Debates, in THE MASS-EXTINCTION DEBATES: HOW SCIENCE
WORKS IN A CRISIS 62 (1994).
32. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6, 21–22 (1993);
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 7, 50 (2012).
33. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 242 (1986).
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for authors and law schools (triage, certification, and
branding). The question is, does the genre have any use value
in its present incarnation? Or is it instead the remains of an
archaic jurisprudence sustained in a kind of intellectual
Chapter 11 because neither legal academics nor law review
editors have the chutzpah to break out of the collective mimesis
problem and actually say what they think?
Ahem.
Thought Two. The mutually re-enforcing aspect of the
contest of fictions seems to yield a discourse in which we (you
and I) try not merely to make truth, but to evaluate whether
and to what degree truth has indeed been made (or, in an older
idiom, found). This evaluation procedure (conducted in articles,
workshops, conferences, etc.) is a kind of academic meta-fiction
organized into what might be called “rightness disputes.”
Rightness disputes are not the same thing as a quest for
rightness (in the same sense that OCD is not the same thing as
checking the stove before you go out). The pursuit of rightness
(like checking the stove) are generally good things to do. By
contrast, rightness disputes (like OCD) seem to be sustained
forays into the repetitive and the overwrought.
In rightness disputes, the little homunculus on your
shoulder is on speed. He is constantly asking you (even as you
are writing your article or giving your talk), “Is this right?”
“What arguments support your views?” “What establishes the
validity of your argument?” “Is this claim consistent with your
priors?” “Didn’t you say that . . . and now you say that . . . .”
And here you are trying to write your article or give your talk,
but still the little speed-addled homunculus interrupts to ask,
“Do you have a warrant for that?” “Where is the empirical
corroboration?” “On what authority?” “This needs to be more
precise—there are at least four subdivisions you need to make
and address here.”
And the little homunculus seems to have a Greek chorus as
backup: “Subdivide and subsume!” “Specify and distinguish!”
“Justify and redeem!” “Corroborate and confirm!”
And sooner or later, you might realize (if so, it would come
to you with the force of revelation) that the little homunculus
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and the Greek correctness chorus do not care a wit—not one
wit—whether you are right or not. What they care about—the
only thing they care about—is playing rightness disputes. And
then it might dawn on you that so do all the other people in the
room. And at that point it might dawn on you that rightness
disputes are no more about rightness than OCD is about
turning off the stove.
And then yet another realization arrives—this one truly
upsetting: It turns out that the topic of your talk, the very
object of your legal passion, the very focus of your jural raison
d’être, does not matter to the people in the room either. They
are just using your article and your talk—hell, they are using
you (yes, you!)—as the terrain on which to play out their
rightness disputes. Your article, your talk, you could be about
anything—anything at all!
And as you come to recognize this, you have this deep
sense of déjà vu. You’ve experienced this before. And then
finally it hits you: Oh, my god, you are a junior associate again!
Totally generic. Totally replaceable. Totally formalized into an
abstraction of yourself. You are back to the place you tried so
hard to escape from. How did it come to this? Why is this
happening?
And then yet another realization breaks through: there is
such a thing as rightness disputes. Rightness disputes are the
trans-disciplinary or sur-disciplinary structure of academic
knowledge production. It’s the lingua franca of academia!
Thirty years ago, it was “where’s your epistemic warrant—
where do you stand to say that?” Twenty years ago, it was,
“where’s your methodology?” Ten years ago, it was, “where’s
your empirical backup?” Today, it’s . . . . There’s kind of odd
sameness to it all isn’t there? I mean if you allow for slight
shifts in semantics and orientation, it’s basically the same
rightness grammar at work, isn’t it? From the grave, from the
grave.
Zombie-law?
Of course, notice it would all be O.K. if one were convinced
that the frames that enable the rightness disputes to get off the
ground were not themselves so contestable, so compromised.
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But they are compromised—aren’t they? 34
PART V
There is a real irony in rightness disputes. The irony is
that with rightness disputes, there is no reason a law review
article should ever end. In the same way that checking the
stove one more time (please note the marginal cost is low)
couldn’t possibly hurt (“I’m gonna make doubly sure this time”),
asking one more rightness question is relatively costless as
well. Come on, just one more.
No? O.K. Good for you.
This then brings us to what I call exit-framing and
abandonment. Exit-framing as its name implies is the frame
the author leaves the reader.
There is the explicit exit-frame. This could be an edict. Or a
balancing test or a nexus test or a default regime or a totality
of circumstances test or an injunction to prove effect by
reference to intent or intent by reference to effect. Or . . . . In
short, any of the usual legal formulae can serve as exit
framing.
There is also the implicit exit-frame. We won’t go into the
complexities on this one except to note that . . . . No. We just
won’t.
With explicit exit-framing, there is a choice to be made by
the author here: an edict is not a balancing test is not a default
regime (though we could combine all three). And so the
question is not just how did we get here (why balancing?).
Presumably, I’ve got that covered. 35 Actually, the really
interesting question is how we stop. This is the moment I call
34. This is the gist of the overarching set of inquiries pursued more
intensively in The Knowledge Bubble. Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble, supra note
9; Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
35. Well, actually, no I don’t. You and I generally know, of course, from the
tone of any given law review article which way it’s heading. When we get to the
exit-frame, it’s hardly a surprise. In fact, very often we know from the entry-frame
what the exit-frame will look like. And yet I have to say, I am always a bit jolted
when the edict, the test, is actually delivered there on page whatever. Jolted as
in—really? You, the author, are actually going to do this to me (to us) again? Do
you have any idea (of course, you do) how many times this particular stylized
solution has been presented in similar circumstances before? I mean, couldn’t you
have thought of doing something else? Why is this happening?
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abandonment. In order to have an exit-framing, you need to
have abandonment.
If you’re a judge, you need to decide that you’ve addressed
the arguments by the parties sufficiently and that you must
now simply decide. If you’re a law review writer, you need to
determine that enough is enough, that the argument must
cease and the rightness disputes stop. But how do you do that?
How do you let go? Why not another question? Come on, just
one more. How could it hurt?
See: It’s hard to stop.
How then do you do it?
CONCLUSION
Right. Exactly.
Now among the several sections of the law review article
vying for most preposterous, the Conclusion is undoubtedly the
most stone cold absurd of them all. The Conclusion is just
simply preposterous.
Interestingly, it is often the place where readers will turn
to first. If that happens to be you right now, things are
probably not working out so well. In fact my guess is that
you’re probably wondering what’s going on here? How in the
hell is this a conclusion? Why is this happening?
What to do? My advice—go read the Introduction.
For all you others, well, here we are again. You and I. On
different sides of the text that is supposed to yield a conclusion.
The Conclusion is supposed to be the wrap. Almost always
it will be a normative wrap. Perhaps not so much because we
are committed normative thinkers (this is 2000-something not
1990) but rather because law review editors want some
normative payoff and law review authors comply. The
normative wrap is the academic equivalent of the legal brief’s
prayer for relief. It all comes down to this—a few paragraphs, a
string of sentences—the takeaway.
The author, of course, has reason to feel pretty good about
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reaching this point. Not only is an arduous law review journey
coming to an end, but this is the moment where the author
hands off responsibility to the reader. It’s as if the author were
telling the reader, “O.K., reader, my work is done now. You
take it from here. You should . . . the court should . . . the
agency should . . . somebody should . . . .” That’s quite a
responsibility to place on the reader. It could cause anxiety if
not properly handled.
In truth, this should be a moment of high anxiety for
everyone involved (not just the reader). The author, too. In fact,
the legal academic community generally. Why? Well, because it
is almost never clear, not clear at all, just what mechanism is
supposed to bridge the yawning gap between the words on the
page and the enactment of the recommended action. 36 And that
is because, just possibly, there may be none. Or maybe it’s
because . . .

36. Cf. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610–11
(1986) (on the persistent chasm in law between thought and action). I have made
much of such chasms in the critiques of normativity. One of the variants is
contained in an essay called “Values,” which describes how legal actors
appropriate values and value-talk to service the imperatives of bureaucratic law.
See generally Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HUM. 219 (1994).

